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Note
THE MIGRATORY DIVORCE
"If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from
their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell
whether they are married and, if so, to whom. Today many people
who have simply lived m more than one state do not know, and the
most learned lawyer cannot advise them ,with any confidence. The
uncertainties that result are not merely technical, nor are they trivial;
they affect fundamental rights and relations such as the lawfulness of
their cohabitation, their childrens' legitimacy, their title to property,
and even whether they are law-abiding persons or criminals. In a
society as mobile and nomadic as ours, such uncertainties affect large
numbers of people and create a social problem of some magnitude."1
This statement is not the complaint of a judge during the early
common law period, but is taken from the dissent of justice Jackson
to a decision of the United States Supreme Court in the year 1947
Most persons acquainted to any degree with the laws in respect to
recognition of divorce decrees know the causes of the apparent con-
sternation alluded to here, but it might assist the consideration of the
problem to outline briefly the development of the present situation.
The law as to recognition by one state of a divorce proceeding in
another state (hereafter referred to as a foreign divorce, such being the
term generally used) seemed fairly stable prior to the year 1900. In
1906 the Supreme Court decided the leading case of Haddock v Had-
dock,2 which was regarded by many to have been the first stirring of
mud into reasonably clear waters by the approval of the doctrine of
jurisdictional fault. This was followed in 1938 by Davis v Davis,3
which cleared the view somewhat. The husband sued the wife for
divorce in that case and she appeared and contested jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court held that where the jurisdictional basis for the decree
had actually been contested in the divorce court proceeding, the find-
ing of that court was a conclusive adjudication thereof, and entitled
to recognition under the full faith and credit clause.
4
IJackson, J., dissenting in Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 553, 92 L. Ed. 1561, 68
S. Ct. 1218, 1 A.L.R. 2d 1412 (1947).
2 201 U. S. 562, 50 L. Ed. 867, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906).
'805 U. S. 32, 88 L. Ed. 26, 59 S. Ct. 3, 118 A.L.R. 1518 (1938).
U. C. CONsT. APT. LV sec. I: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts,
Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
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The Davis decision was followed by the notorious case of Williams
v. North Carolina.5 Petitioner Williams was married m North Caro-
lina and lived there with his wife until May, 1940. Petitioner Hendrix
was married in North Carolina and lived there with her husband until
the same date. At that time the petitioners went to Nevada, and each
filed a divorce action there. Defendants in these actions did not ap-
pear and were not personally served in Nevada. One was served by
publication and by mail; the other was served m person in North
Carolina. In both cases the Nevada court found the petitioner to be a
bona fide and continuous resident of the State of Nevada, and granted
a divorce. The petitioners were married immediately thereafter, and
returned to North Carolina, where they lived together until indicated
for bigamous cohabitation. They were tried and convicted. Upon
appeal to the Supreme court of North Carolina, the conviction was
affirmed," it being held that, by reason of the decision in Haddock v
Haddock,7 North Carolina was not required to recognize the Nevada
decree under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court, a momentous decision was written. In
its main points, the majority held, (1) that jurisdichon in divorce cases
)s partially in rem and partially in personam; (2) that "residence" re-
quirements generally used in state statutes really require "domicile,"
and where the issue of domicile is not raised in a later adjudication,
it must be assumed that the finding by the foreign divorce court of
domicile in the plaintiff is correct; (3) that where the plaintiff is a
domiciliary of the court rendering the divorce, constructive service
on the defendant spouse meets the requirement of due process, where
such is provided for by statute; (4) that jurisdictional fault is no
longer a part of the divorce law;8 and (5) that conceding that the
plaintiff was a domiciliary of the divorce court, and the defendant
spouse had been reached by constructive service in accordance with
state statute, the court of a sister state had no alternative but to recog-
nize the divorce as valid, since the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution applied. Haddock v Haddock was expressly overruled,
and the case was remanded.
Upon retrial,9 it was decided by the North Carolina court that no
bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada. On appeal,1 the Supreme
317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207 87 L. Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273 (1942).8 State v. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. 2d 769 (1941).
See note 2, supra.
317 U. S. 287, 301: we see no reason, and none has here been advanced,
for making the existence of state power depend on an inquiry as to where the fault
in each domestic dispute lies."
"State v. Williams, 224 N. C. 183, 29 S. E. 2d 744 (1944).
1 325 U, S, 226, 89 L. Ed. 1577, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 157 A.L.R. 1366 (1944).
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Court held that the decree of the divorce was " a conclusive
adjudication of everything except the jurisdictional facts upon wuch
it is founded, and domicile is a jurisdictional fact "11 and that the
sister state, in the interest of protecting its own domiciliaries, can
ascertain for itself the truth or existence of that crucial fact.
Justices Douglas, Black and Rutledge dissented. However, all of
the justices concurred in a subsequent case involving many of the same
factors-that of Esenwern v Pennsylvanza.'2 There the wife, after a
separation, secured a separate maintenance decree in Pennsylvania.
Later the husband went to Nevada and filed suit for divorce upon the
expiration of six weeks' residence. After a Nevada divorce was granted
the husband moved to Ohio, and subsequently petitioned the Penn-
sylvania court to vacate the prior separate maintenance decree, alleg-
ing his Nevada divorce and relying upon the first Williams case. Jur-
isdiction of the Nevada court to grant the divorce was questioned by
the wife and it was held by the Pennsylvania court that the husband
was not domiciled in the divorce court's jurisdiction when the divorce
was rendered, and therefore full faith and credit need not be given.a
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.i 4 Accounting
for their concurrence in this decision, as contrasted with their dissent
in the second Williams case, Rutledge agreed with Black and Douglas
that " the jurisdictional foundation for a decree in one state
capable of foreclosing an action for maintenance or support in another
may be different from that required to alter marital status with extra-
territorial effect."a Such a distinction is unsound on its face, since
the same rule should govern both civil and criminal case.
Shortly after this, two companion cases, Sherrer v Sherrer"I and
Coe v. Coe,17 reached the Supreme Court. The facts in these two
cases were substantially the same, involving an appearance by the
contesting party and an adjudication of jurisdictional domicile, but
with no contest thereof. The only substantial distinction between the
two cases was that in the latter the question of jurisdiction was later
raised by the party who secured the divorce on a counter-claim. The
Supreme Court held in both actions that there is nothing in the con-
"Id. or 232, 89 L. Ed. at 1583, 65 S. Ct. at 1'096, 157 A.L.R. at 1371.
"325 U S. 279, 89 L. Ed. 1608, 65 S. Ct. 1118, 157 A.L.R. 1396 (19-15).
"348 Pa. 455, 35 A. 2d 335 (1944).
"See note 12, supra.
"325 U. S. 279, 283, 89 L. Ed. 1608, 1611, 65 S. Ct. 1118, 1120, 157 A.L.R. 1396.
1399 (1945).
16334 U. S. 343, 92 L. Ed. 1429, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 1 A.L.R. 2d 1355 (1947).
17 334 U. S. 378, 92 L, Ed. 1451, 68 S. Ct, 1094, 1 A.LR. 2d 1376 (1947).
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cept of due process which demands that a defendant be afforded a
second opportunity to litigate the existence of jurisdictional facts, and
therefore jurisdictional domicile could not be denied once an oppor-
tunity had been offered and the defendant bad appeared in the pro-
ceedings.18 Dissent in both cases was to the effect that an appearance
is not necessarily an adjudication of jurisdictional facts, and that such
a decision as was here rendered would throw open the doors for
collusion.
The next two companion cases to be brought before the Supreme
Court which merit attention were Estin v EstinO and Krezger v
Kreiger,20 the decisions of which have been vigorously criticized by
many writers. Both cases involved decrees of separate maintenance
followed by ex parte foreign divorces. It was held that the prior
decrees survived the divorces. This was in the face of the fact
that in the first case the decision was that of a New York court which
bad consistently held that a separate maintenance decree did not sur-
vive an absolute divorce granted in New York." In the latter case the
wife did not in any manner contest the validity of the foreign decree,
nor did she question the husband's jurisdictional domicile.
In a forceful dissent, in the Estin case, Justice Jackson said,2-
"The Court reaches the Solomon-like conclusion that the
Nevada decree is half good and half bad under the full faith and
credit clause. It is good to free the husband from the marrage; it is
not good to free him from incidental obligations. Assuming the judg-
ment to be one which the constitution requires to be recognized at
all, I do not see how we can square this decision with the command
that it be given full faith and credit."
The only other case which merits consideration in viewing the prob-
lem is that of Rice v Rice.2 3 There the husband secured a foreign di-
vorce with service by publication, remarried, and moved to a third
state. Following his death shortly thereafter, both his former wife and
the woman he subsequently married claimed the rights of widow in
his property The court held for his former wife, on the ground that
he had not acquired a domicile in the foreign state to give the divorce
court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in a Per Curzam opinion
This represents a tendency toward liberalization. The former decision on
this point-Davis v. Davis, supra, note 4-was interpreted as holding that such was
conclusive, but only if there was an actual contest of such facts in the divorce pro-
ceedings.
"See note 1, supra.
'334 U S. 555, 92 L. Ed. 1572, 68 S. Ct. 1221 (1947).
-'296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E. 2d 113 (1947).
'334 U. S. 541, 554, 92 L- Ed. 1561, 1571, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 1221 (1947).
335 U. S. 842, 93 L. Ed. 770, 69 S. Ct. 751 (1948).
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(five to four) that the full faith and credit clause did not preclude the
court from making this determination.
Although he did not like the manner by which the divorce was
reached, Justice Jackson dissented on the basis of the first Williams
case, saying,
"This Court is not responsible for all the contradictions
and conflicts resulting from our federal system or from our crazy quilt
of divorce laws, but we are certainly compounding those difficulties
by repudiating the usual requirements of procedural due process in
divorce cases and compensating for it by repudiating the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.""'
To summarize, a divorce proceeding is still considered to be quast
in rem. It may be brought by either spouse, irrespective of whose fault
occasioned the marital rift, in a jurisdiction where he or she has a bona
fide "domicil." It is not requisite that the defendant spouse appear in
the proceedings in order to entitle the decree to recognition and effect
in another state under the full faith and credit clause, since construc-
tive service in accordance with state statute is regarded as sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of due process. The finding of the jurisdic-
tional fact of bona fide domicil by the divorce court is prima facie
evidence of such fact in any subsequent proceedings, and the burden
Is on the contesting party to overcome such evidence. The jurisdic-
tional fact of bona fide domicile can be questioned by the defendant
spouse, however, unless jurisdiction was secured of his or her person by
the divorce court. In the event that it was, the adjudication of these
jurisdictional facts is a bar to attack except on appeal, even though no
issue was raised thereon by the pleadings or the evidence.2 5 Further,
the marital status is regarded as separable from the property rights
arising out of the marriage, and a decree which effectively dissolves
the marriage does not necessarily destroy these property rights.
Is the present state of the law as to migratory divorce sufficient
motivation for a change, or should the law remain in its present condi-
tion, to be changed only by subsequent decisions in the due course of
time? The argument most often offered for a change in the law is that.
such anomalous phenomena as a man with two wives, or a woman
with two husbands-one relationship valid here, and the other valid
i 335 U. S. 842, 93 L. Ed. 770, 774 (1948).
SSherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 351 (1948): " the requirements of full
faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree onjunsdictional grounds in the courts of a sister State where there has been participa-
ton by the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where the defendant has been
accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree
is not susceptible to such collateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered
the decree,"
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there-must be removed from the law Also, it has been suggested that
the treatment presently given occasions bickering and bad feeling be-
tween the state courts, and between the states. Another contention
often advanced is that the unusual holding that property rights and
marital rights may be separated, the former being permitted to exist
without the latter, has no sound basis in logic of law
The opponents of change are not without arguments to support
their view They maintain that blanket recognition of all divorces
would entail the undersirable consequences of a divorce practically at
will, and in particular that fair and substantial opportunity would not
be given to the defendant spouse to litigate the merits or the jurisdic-
tion of the court to grant the divorce. They further allege that the
result of many of the modifications suggested would impair the funda-
mental concept of marriage as something more than a mere contract.
They also avow that protection should be afforded to those who re-
main at home at least as much, if not more, than it is to those who leave.
It is doubtful that any solution to the problem of migratory divorce
is readily available, though several have been suggested.' In 1948 the
McCarran bill2 7 was proposed by its author "to further implement the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution." In effect, this requires
that full faith and credit be given to a divorce decree, provided: (1)
the decree is final; (2) the decree is valid in the state where rendered.
(:3) the decree contains recitals setting forth that the jurisdictional
prerequisites of the state to the granting of the divorce have been met;
and (4) the state where the decree was rendered was the last marital
domicile of the spouses, or the defendant was personally subject to
the jurisdiction or appeared generally in the proceedings. In all such
cases except cases involving intrinsic fraud in the recitals of the de-
cree of divorce, the decree shall constitute a conclusive determination
of the jurisdictional facts necessary to the decree. Although this would
increase the certainty of recognition of divorce decrees where the
standard of the McCarran bill is met, it merely establishes a standard.
Where this standard is met, complete recognition is insured. Compli-
ance is not required, however, and where the standard is not met, the
"I For a discussion of procedural changes advocated for divorce in general, see
New Procedures and Attitudes Suggested Toward Marriage and Divorce, 32 JOURNAL
OF T tE AM. JUDICATURE SOCIETY 38 (August, 1948). In regard to the much discussed
migratory divorce problem, Judge Alexander says: " when it is considered
that migratory divorces constitute only a small fraction of the grand total one
wonders if it isn't a case of the tail trying to wag the dog." He sums up the present
state of divorce law under the sub-title "Utter Imbecility of Present Law," a desig-
nation with which this writer wholly agrees.
-As cited in 1 OKLA. L. REv. 151, 162, n. 51 (1948).
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existing law presumably will apply Alteration of existing state law as
to grounds for divorce or residence requirements is not essential.
Further, it is not certain that the Supreme Court would recognize the
act as constitutional. It might also be noted that the act reintroduces
the concept of "marital domicile."
Another type of federal legislation has been suggested by Professor
Franklin,'2 8 although this is admittedly a partial solution only It would
(1) change the requirement of domicile to residence, (2) require a
minimum residence of six months or a year for full faith and credit
divorces (although it would not affect 'local" or "intrastate" divorces),
and (3) would require only residence of the plaintiff plus the "best
possible notice to the defendant under the circumstances"-m accord
with the principles laid down in the first Williams case-rather than
marital domicile or personal jurisdiction as required by the McCarran
bill. The author of this bill admits that its constitutionality is open
to question.29
It would seem that no completely satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem can be achieved without at least the assistance of a constitutional
amendment. The difficulty of securing the adoption of such an amend-
ment is illustrated by the fact that such an amendment has been
periodically proposed since 1923 by the late Senator Arthur Capper of
Kansas. The proposed amendment states that " the Congress
shall have power to make laws, which shall be uniform throughout the
United States, on marriage and divorce, the legitimation of children,
and the care and custody of children affected by annulment of mar-
riage or by divorce."30
I Although this amendment is enthusiastically approved by this
writer, the bill which was introduced to secure the solution of the
problem, 31 if and when the amendment was ratified by the legislatures
of three-fourths of the states, is not regarded as a solution to the prob-
lem. In that bill, six grounds for divorce are provided, but there is
no requirement that either plaintiff or defendant be a resident of the
state in which the divorce is sought. If the defendant is not a resident
and does not appear, the prosecuting attorney of the judicial district is
required to appear and defend on behalf of the state. If successful,
the plaintiff is granted an interlocutory decree which becomes final
only after the lapse of one year.
's The Dilemma of Migratorn Divorces: A Partial Solution Through Federal
Legislation, 1 OKLA. L. R~v. ,151 (1948).
2Id. at 170.
'0As cited in 1 OKLA. L. REV. 151, i53, n. 7 (1948).
31 Ibid.
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It seems unlikely that an attack on any single phase of the problem
will present an acceptable solution. The solution here advocated,
though admittedly difficult of attainment, involves: (1) recognition
of divorce as in personam, rather than quasi in rem; (2) constitutional
amendment in order to permit federal control; and (3) establishment
by federal legislation of divorce laws uniform throughout the United
States. It is submitted that by this process, and only by this process,
can the Gordian Knot of our present divorce law be cut.
It is an established fact that marriage is the foundation of society
As such, its consummation and its dissolution are of concern to the
state, and equally so to the nation. It is a personal relation, however.
The concept of such a bond resulting in the creation of a res separate
and distinct from the parties is a holdover from former eras when
much attention was given to intangible concepts which had little, if
any, relationship to reality Many of these remain in the law, although
the needs of society for which they were created have long since van-
ished. In an excellent article on the subject, Professor Corwin said: 32
"The concept of the marriage status as a res which, the moment a di-
vorce suit is brought, splits into two parts like a peapod, is even more
absurd than the concept of 'domicile,' of which the essential element
is an unprovable 'intent. " It is not contended that marriage is a
mere contract; it is indeed something more. It is, however, primarily
a personal relationship, and it seems illogical that the state should be
regarded more essential to the divorce proceedings than the defendant
spouse. It is therefore advocated that the Supreme Court regard an
action of divorce as being in personam. There has been some trend
in the Supreme Court toward such a holding, and it is possible that
it may yet come to pass. The concept of divisible divorce will pass
with it, since the rights of both parties will be adjudicated in the single
proceeding.
This alone would, be wholly inadequate to solve the problem. In
the absence of federal legislation, the so-called "strict" states would
become refuges for stubborn and unprincipled spouses. And in order
to secure federal legislation of unquestioned constitutionality, constitu-
tional amendment is indispensable.
What should constitute grounds for divorce under tls federal
legislation has been the subject of much discussion. In this writer's
opinion, the most reasonable suggestion is that there be only one
ground-separation of the parties for a specific period with intent to
;" Out-Haddocking Haddock, 93 PA. L. Rv. 341, 356 (1945).
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abandon marital relations. The advisability of tls proposed legisla-
tion has been lucidly enunciated in a recent article by a practicing
attorney who speaks with the voice of experience.33 In advocating
such a course, Mr. Walker says:34 "This is no device for making divorce
easy Neither is it a road block in the way of divorce. Present di-
vorce laws are brutal and filthy They also lend aid to impetuosity
Divorce, it seems, should be based on a general principle. Marriage
is." He concludes by maintaining that the right to separate should be
of equal dignity with the right to marry
Separation for a period of years has been adopted as a ground for
divorce in sixteen states and the district of Columbia, adoption having
increased in recent years. The period required varies; it is ten years
in two states and two to five years in others.3 A shorter period than
that required by most states having such laws would seem warranted;
two years of separation should be a sufficient requirement. Few
couples who have separated are reconciled after such a period, unless
a divorce "clears the marital air," as it sometimes does. At the expira-
tion of such a period both parties have had adequate time to reach a
choice,between continuance or dissolution of the relationship. Since
no other grounds will be available, impetuosity is quashed. Further,
affianced couples are notified in advance that a two-year period of
adjustment is in prospect; they can no longer rush into marriage with
the expectation of securing a "quickie" divorce and moving on to
greener pastures if their marital relationship should falter in the early
stages. As was previously stated, this suggested federal legislation is
not a "road block;" neither is it a 'device for making divorce easy
It is contended that such changes will answer the arguments both
pro and con regarding modification of the present migratory divorce
law36 Though arduous, such a solution is far from impossible. The
United States is in the throes of a social awakening, where social cus-
toms and mores no longer adequate are being discarded, and adjust-
ment of social usage to basic needs and the realities of life is in
progress. We must not be content -to alter the surface and leave un-
touched our outmoded laws in regard to the family
DELBERT L. McLAUGHLIN
= Walker, Our Present Divorce Muddle: A Suggested Solution, 35 A.B.A.J. 457
(June, 1949).
34Id. at 457.
3-See Note, 97 PA. L. Rlv. 705 (1949), for a discussion of the present state of
separation laws.
In this respect, it might be helpful to reread the arguments as set forth supra.
